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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT
OF APPEALS
Case No. 890544

BRUCE P. PALMER,
Defendant/Appellant.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to

review a Rule 31 decision of the Court of Appeals clearlysupported by case law and statute?
2.

Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to

consider whether all actions, officers, undertakings,
legislation, elected officials, courts and other activities
of the State of Utah are unconstitutional?
3.

Is Salt Lake City preempted by Federal law from

regulating location of certain structures, including
satellite dish antennas, in front yards?
4.

Should the City be awarded its costs and fees for

replying to this groundless Petition?
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Court of Appeals determined to review the Circuit
Court's conviction under its Rule 31, R. Utah Ct. App.,
procedure and affirmed the trial court's conviction without
an opinion on November 29, 1989.

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
The Petition fails to comply with Rule 46(a)(6)(D),
R.U.S.C., in that it fails to specify the statutory
provisions conferring jurisdiction on this Court to grant
the Writ of Certiorari.

Further, nowhere in the Petition is

there any citation or references to any "special and
important reasons'' provided in Rule 43, R.U.S.C., for the
grant of Certiorari.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Salt Lake City Ordinance:
§ 51-5-7. Front yard exceptions. The area of a
required front yard shall be open and unobstructed
except for the following which are permitted:
(1) Fences, walls, or other similar structures as
provided elsewhere by this chapter.
(2) Uncovered steps leading to the main building;
provided, however, that they are not more than four
feet in height and do not cause any danger or hazard
to traffic by obstructing the view of the street or
intersection. Any portion of any steps, covered or
uncovered, that are more than four feet above grade
must be back of the required setback line.
(3)

Eaves or cornices projecting not more than two

feet,
(4) Driveway leading to a properly located garage or
parking area; provided, however, no portion of a front
yard as required in this ordinance, except for those
approved driveways, shall be hard-surfaced or graveled
Of course, since the Petition claims that neither this
Court nor any governing legislation passed by the
Legislature is constitutionally valid it would be difficult
for the Petition to allege that the Court has any
jurisdition whatsoever.

so as to encourage or make possible the parking of
automobiles, nor shall the city allow any curb cuts or
approve any driveways except for entrance and exit
driveways leading to properly located parking areas.
(5) Circular driveways shall be permitted in required
front yard areas of single family dwellings leading to
and from a properly located garage or carport on the
property subject to the following conditions:
(a) All such drives shall be of concrete
construction.
(b) Such drives shall not be over twelve (12)
feet in width.
(c) There shall be an area in landscaping at
least fifteen (15) feet in depth from the front
property line to the farthest edge of the drive.
(d) Driveway areas are not to be used for the
parking or storage of any trailer, boat or other
equipment at any time, nor is the area to be
used for overnight or permanent parking of any
vehicle.
(e) Passenger automobiles may be parked on
driveways serving private residences, provided
the automobile is parked completely on private
property.
Federal Communication Commission Regulation.

47 CFR

Ch. 1 (10-1-88 edition) §25.104.
State and local zoning or other regulations that
differentiate between satellite receive-only antennas
and other types of antenna facilities are preempted
unless such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health,
safety or aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable
limitations on, or prevent, reception of satellite
delivered signals by receive-only antennas or to
impose costs on the users of such antennas that are
excessive in light of the purchase and installation
cost of the equipment.

Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas is
preempted in the same manner except that sate and
local health and safety regulation is not preempted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a continuing appeal from a criminal conviction
after a jury trial in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake
City, the Honorable Floyd H. Gowens presiding, on the
charges of placing an illegal structure in a front yard
under the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, § 51-5-7.
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
At trial on July 5, 1989 a jury of the Third Circuit
Court found the defendant had not complied with an order
from Salt Lake City's Building and Housing Division
concerning placement of a satellite dish antenna in the
petitioner's front yard and was, accordingly, guilty of
violating § 51-5-7, R.O.S.L.C. Petitioner's appeal to the
Court of Appeals was heard on the Court's Rule 31 calendar
and the decision was affirmed on November 29, 1989.

C.
FACTS OF THE CASE2
1.

Defendant Bruce Palmer ("Palmer") is the owner of

the real property at 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue•
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, (R. 50-51).
2.

Craig Spangenberg of the Salt Lake City Building

and Housing Division received a complaint concerning 833
East Pennsylvania Avenue (R.37).

At that location, he

observed a satellite dish antenna located in the front yard
(R.38).

Spangenberg advised the defendant that the

satellite dish in the front yard was a violation of Salt
Lake City ordinance on December 16, 1987.
3.

(R. 43).

On December 17, 1987, Spangenberg issued Palmer a

Notice and Order by certified mail (R. 43-44) notifying the
defendant that he was in violation of Salt Lake City
Ordinance § 51-5-7 allowing only certain structures in the
front yard and ordering Palmer to remove a satellite dish
located in his front yard before January 4, 1988.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6).
4.

A misdemeanor citation for violation of Salt Lake

City Ordinance 51-5-7 was issued to Palmer on January 6,
1988 (CR 1-2).

Throughout the entire Petition for the Writ of Certiorari,
in violation of Rule 46 (a)(8), there is not a single
citation to the record.

5.

Palmer was advised of his right to apply for a

variance on December 31, 1988 (R. 45). Palmer did not
apply for a variance (R. 47). At trial on July 5, 1989,
the jury found the defendant had not complied with the
notice and order (R.52) and was guilty of violating §51-57, R.O.S.L.C.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Salt Lake City's regulation of front yard

structures, including satellite receive only dish antennas,
is not preempted by federal law because Salt Lake's
regulation does not differentiate between satellite receive
only antennas and other types of antennas and the Salt Lake
City ordinance has reasonable health, safety and aestetic
objectives that do not impose unreasonable limitations on
satellite received signals.
2.

Palmer's six other issues including the trial

court, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court lacking
jurisdiction because of various failures to file oaths are
without any substantial merit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SALT LAKE CITY'S REGULATION OF FRONT
YARD STRUCTURES INCLUDING SATELLITE
RECEIVE ONLY ANTENNAS IS NOT PREEMPTED
BY FEDERAL LAW.
The pivotal issue in his case is whether Salt Lake
City Ordinance § 51-5-7 regulating what structures are

permissible on front yards is preempted by Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) regulation•
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a
federal law may preempt a state law where conflict exists
between the federal and state law.

U.S. Constitution

Article VI, §2. Similarly federal regulations may preempt
state and local laws.
L.Ed.2d 580 (1984).

Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 81

A federal regulation preempts local

law if the federal agency has exercised complete authority
in the area in question and if the agency is legally
authorized to preempt local law.

New York v. FCC, 100

L.Ed.2d 45, 57-59 (1988).
In this case the FCC has exercised its regulatory
authority over satellite receive only dish antennas. The
federal regulations, however, specifically allow local
control under certain guidelines.

Federal Regulation 47

CFR §25.104 states that all local laws inconsistent with

its requirements are preempted.

3

The FCC has adopted regulations dealing specifically
with federal preemption of local zoning for satellite
antennas, entitled, "Preemption of Local Zoning of Earth
Stations." 47 CFR §25.104. This regulation establishes the
following standards for preempting local law.
State and local zoning or other regulations that
differentiate between satellite receive-only antennas
and other types of antenna facilities are preempted
unless such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health,
safety or aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable limitations
on, or prevent, reception of satellite delivered
signals by receive-only antennas or to impose costs on
the users of such antennas that are excessive in light
of the purchase and installation cost of the
equipment.
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas is
preempted in the same manner except that state and
local health and safety regulation is not preempted.
(Emphasis added.)

3
It is unclear whether the FCC in promulgating the
preemption, has acted within the boundaries of its
authority. In Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696
F.Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988), defendants asserted that the FCC
had exceeded its authority in preempting local regulations
of satellite antenna. The court held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider this issue bacause, "before
an FCC order is submitted to judicial review, the FCC must
have been given the opportunity to reconsider its position"
Id. at 1029. However, for the purpose of this Brief, it is
assumed that the FCC has legal authority to preempt local
law. The fact that the FCC has not reconsidered its positin
on preemption in this case, or others, may perhaps defeat
the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals to consider
this issue.

This regulation establishes an initial standard to
determine if federal preemption occurs, i.e. the local
zoning ordinance must differentiate between satellite
receive only antennas and other types of antennas before
federal preemption occurs.

If a local ordinance

differentiates between satellite receive only antenna and
other types of antenna facilities federal preemption is
still not automatic.

The federal regulation then provides

a two part balancing test.

If the local restriction: (1)

is reasonably related to health, safety or aesthetic
objectives, and, (2) does not impose costly burdens and
limitations on satellite users; it is not preempted by
federal law.
The threshold question thus is whether the City
ordinance ''differentiates" between "satellite receive-only
antenna" and "other types of antenna facilities."

Palmer

was convicted of violating Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7
which states, in part, "[T]he area of a required front yard
shall be open and unobstructed except for the following
which are permitted:
(1) A fence or wall . . .
(2) Uncovered steps . . .
4
Van Meter, supra, at 1029-1031; Breelinq v. Churchill, 423
N.W.2d 469, 471 (Neb. 1988); L.I.M.A. Partners v. Northvale,
530 A.2d 839, 844 (N.J. Super. a.D. 1987); Minars v. Rose,
507 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (A.D.2d Dept. 1986); Ross v. Hatfield,
640 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.Kan. 1988).

(3)

Eaves or cornices . . .

(4) A driveway leading to a properly
placed garage . . .
(5) Circular driveways • . ."
Section 51-5-7 does not differentiate between types of
antennas.

It does not allow any type of antenna, whether

satellite, UHF, VHF, or radio antenna, to be placed in a
front yard.

This section simply lists five (5) permitted

structures which can be placed in front yards.

Since the

City ordinance prohibits all types of antenna from being
placed in front yards, it does not discriminate among the
various types of antenna.

Thus, the City's ordinance meets

the FCC's first requirement and preemption is unwarranted.
Even if the discrimination test was met, §51-5-7,
would still survive the two part balancing test and there
would be no federal preemption.

The purpose of the

ordinance is to diminish the unsightly visual impact of
antenna by prohibiting placement in a front yard.

The

ordinance alleviates the concern with the surrounding
property values which may be diminished by placing antenna
in a front yard.

Some safety concerns may also be achieved

by preventing antenna placement in front yards to avoid the

hazards of a fallen or windblown antenna.

5

The City ordinance must not prevent or impose
unreasonable limitations on satellite reception; nor impose
unreasonable costs.

Here, the City ordinance does not

completely prohibit the use of satellite antenna or other
antenna facilities.

The ordinance simply prevents front

yard placement of all antennas. Alternative placement
sites are easily available and Salt Lake Code §51-5-6
specifically allows for rear yard placement.

Other

placement alternatives, such as side yard or roof top
placement may be sought.

Furthermore, the City is not

5
Salt Lake City Code Section 21.02.020 (the successor to
§51-1-2, R.O.S.L.C.) provides:
21.02.020 Purpose of Title 21 provisions.
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience,
order, prosperity and welfare of the present and
future inhabitants of Salt Lake City, including among
other things:
A.
The lessening of congestion in the streets or
roads;
B.

Securing safety from fire and other dangers;

C.

Providing adequate light and air;

D.
Classification of land uses and distribution of
land development and utilization;
E.

Protection of the tax base;

F.
and

Securing economy in governmental expenditures;

G.
Fostering the City's industrial, business and
residential development. (Prior code §51-1-2).

insensitive to the unique needs and circumstances of
individuals and properties•

Should no other placement

alternative be available, a satellite user may apply for a
variance to place his satellite in a front yard location.
The City ordinance neither imposes nor creates unreasonable
costs upon the satellite user.

Unlike other ordinances,

the City ordinance does not impose costly screenings or
barriers to be placed around a satellite antenna.
In Van Meter, supra, the town of Maplewood passed an
ordinance prohibiting the placement of satellite antenna in
front yards and on roof tops.

The ordinance required a 10

foot height limitation and the satellite dish to be
enclosed by a 6 foot wall of evergreen shrubbery to hide
its visibility from adjoining property and from the
streets.

Plaintiff, after unsuccessfully applying for a

variance, placed his satellite antenna on his roof.

The

Township of Maplewood commenced action to enforce the
township ordinance.

The court held that although the town

ordinance had a legitimate health, safety and aesthetic
object, it discriminated against satellite antenna users.
The court held that the ordinance singled out satellite
antennas over "other types of antenna facilities," and, in
fact, excluded from the ordinances' coverage UHF, VHF and
radio antennas similarly placed.

The court further

concluded that the screening requirements of evergreen
shrubbery were too costly a burden placed on the satellite
user.

Unlike the Van Meter case Salt Lake City does not
differentiate between antennas.

It makes all types of

antennas subject to the same requirement, they are not
permitted structures in front yard areas and therefore
federal preemption would not apply.

Even if, arguendo,

differentiation could be found the Salt Lake City Ordinance
meets the requirements that there is a reasonable relation
to health, safety and aesthetic objectives and there is no
costly burden or limitation on satellite receive-only
antenna users.
POINT II.
PALMER'S REMAINING ISSUES PRESENTED ON
APPEAL DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Palmer has asserted numerous other issues in this
Petition, fortunately not as many as he raised below.
Issue number 6 raises the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

Defendant alleges that counsel failed to argue

federal preemption and failed to introduce photographs of
other satellite dishes located in Salt Lake City to prove
defendant's selective enforcement argument.

The record,

however, indicates that both of these points were argued to
the court by counsel.

Counsel introduced evidence of other

satellite dishes (R. 61, 62) and attempted to argue the
issue of federal preemption to the court (R. 90).

This Court has set forth the standards that must be
met to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

The defendant must first show that "specific

identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance" and second, that he
was prejudiced as a result of the alleged deficiencies,
i.e., the defendant must "affirmatively show that a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's error,
the result would have been different.

Petitioner's alleged

omissions did not occur and therefore do not constitute the
required showing.

This issue should be dismissed.

Because of their obvious lack of merit the City will
not address Petitioner's issues numbers 3, 4, 5 and 8
dealing with the unconstitutionality of the entire
government of the State of Utah.
POINT III.
THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED SANCTIONS
AGAINST THE PETITIONER
FOR THIS FRIVOLOUS, HARASSING
AND DELAYING APPEAL.
As noted above, the Petition fails in numerous
respects to comply with the Rules of this Court.

There is

no proper statement for the basis of jurisdiction; there is
no citation to the record; and, there is no statement of

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). These standards
have been adopted by this Court in State v. Pursifell, 746
P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987).

any "special and important reason" for the grant of the
Writ.
This Petition, especially issues numbers 3, 4, 5 and
8, violates Rule 33(a) in that it is clearly frivolous and
for the purpose of delay.

It also violates Rule 40(a) in

that there could be no good faith grounds formed after
reasonable inquiry for this Court to grant the Writ.
As in Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987),
Petitioner's mischaracterization of the record, failure to
follow the rules, abuse of appellate process and other
transgressions warrants the imposition of sanctions. See
also, O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Briqham City v. Mantua Town, 754
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d
365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Barber v. Emporium Partnership,
750 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
CONCLUSION
Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7 is not preempted by
FCC regulation.
antennas.

It equally regulates all types of

The ordinance does not discriminate among

antennas and does not create unreasonable limitations on
satellite users.
unwarranted.

Therefore, federal preemption is

The remainder of Palmer's issues are

frivolous and do not merit consideration by this Court.

The jury verdict finding the defendant guilty should be
sustained by this Court and the City should be awarded
sanctions.
DATED this let

day of

J <7\A^a/-S

, 1990.

BATRD
t§sistant City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Respondent
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